Multilateral trading system meaning
The Graduate Institute, Geneva. Despite a record-breaking Relatively high oil prices combined with persistent unemployment and measures designed to reduce budget deficits have undermined short-term growth prospects. While South—South trade continues to explode, trade imbalances — i. Meanwhile, trade negotiations under the Doha Round have reached an impasse, generating uncertainties about the future of the World Trade Organization WTO as a negotiating forum. Under these circumstances, should the system rethink its decision-making process founded upon the predominance of member states, the principle of consensus and the notion of single undertaking, as some critics have suggested? And, if meaning, how could such a reform agenda be initiated at the WTO? Moreover, beyond the negotiating function of the WTO, the paralysis of the system also raises urgent questions about the ability of the system to respond to pressing challenges of our times, such as trade and climate change, or food security and price volatility. What we are facing is the inability of the WTO to adapt and adjust to emerging global trade priorities, those you cannot solve through bilateral deals. In a rapidly changing multi-polar world in which economic wealth is progressively shifting towards the East and the South, and in which resource constraints have become increasingly pressing, international cooperation remains in crisis. The rise of emerging countries like China, India or Brazil and the relative decline of traditional economic powers have created new opportunities, as reflected by the unprecedented growth in South—South trade multilateral over the last decade or so. However, it has also generated new tensions, not least between countries with large trade surpluses and those with growing trade deficits. Such tensions are equally palatable in international negotiations such as the ones dealing with climate change. As growth in demand continues to rise faster than increases in supply — due fundamentally to low productivity growth — food prices are expected to remain high and volatile in the coming years. Several factors have contributed to enhancing price volatility: Trading Doha Round of trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization WTO has now remained in a limbo for several months with no real perspectives for the near future. While several factors explain the stalemate in the ten-year-old trade talks, this paralysis raises uncertainties about the future of the multilateral trading system. After a short review of current trends in international trade and recent developments which have led to the current crisis in the Doha Round, Section 3 considers possible options for reforming the way in which the WTO conducts negotiations. Finally, Section 4 focuses on how the WTO has sought to respond to specific public policy objectives in the past — using the case of food security as an example — and what this tells us about the way in which the multilateral trading system relates tobroader global public policy goals. This figure, the largest since data collection began inaccompanied a 3. According to the WTO WTO, aworld trade growth should settle to a more modest 5. Unsurprisingly, Asia exhibited the fastest real export growth — Meanwhile, merchandise trade grew by Overall developing countries and economies in transition accounted for 45 per cent of total world exports, the highest share ever WTO, a. In particular, regions that rely on natural resource exports — such as Africa, the Middle East or South America — experienced lower growth in trade volumes but significant increases in the dollar value of their exports. African exports were up by 6. Similarly, Latin American exports grew by just 6. Outward FDI from emerging economies also reached record highs, with most of their investment directed towards other countries in the South. On the investment front, despite a 5 per cent increase compared toglobal FDI flows have remained lower than their pre-crisis average —07and 37 per cent below their peak UNCTAD, And while emerging economies in Latin America and South-East Asia experienced a rapid growth, FDI flows continued to contract in developed countries, Africa and South Asia. Several factors might explain why trade and output grew more slowly than they might have. Inrelatively high oil prices raised energy costs for households and business. High unemployment rates also affected domestic consumption and import demand in developed countries. Finally, attempts in Europe, the US and elsewhere to reduce budget deficits led to cuts in spending and revenue, undermining short-term growth prospects. The negative impacts of the financial crisis and global recession are therefore likely to remain for some time despite the record rebound of trade in Over the last 10 to 15 years, these developments have resulted in large imbalances, with sizeable current account deficits accumulating in the US in particular, and large current account surpluses in others, notably China, Germany and Japan. These have in turn generated political tensions, evident in the US—China controversy over exchange rate policies. Intrade imbalances remained smaller than pre-crisis levels, but for most countries, except China, the gap between exports and imports widened compared to see Figures 9. Japan was an exception to the overall trend towards smaller imbalances, as its trade surplus nearly quadrupled in compared to pre-crisis levels. Persistently high levels of debt-financed household consumption in the US will have to return to slightly lower historical levels Mayer, At the same time, low consumption rates and high national savings in China have prompted calls for Beijing to develop its internal market and gradually move from investment and export to consumer-led growth. These trends are likely to affect both the size and composition of global demand in years ahead. This is partly because increased Chinese consumption might not fully compensate a possible decrease in US demand growth, but also because the two economies tend to import different baskets of goods, with China buying more raw material, commodities and food, for example. Unless other trade surplus countries such as Germany or Japan also enhance their domestic consumption, changes in global demand will have major negative repercussions on developing country exports, and also on employment — particularly in manufacturing sectors such as textiles and clothing Mayer, While these developments provide new opportunities — export markets, technology transfer, aid and other forms of cooperation — African exports to other developing countries largely remain concentrated on primary products, with little evidence to date that South—South trade has prompted real structural transformation. The US and other exporting countries continued to insist that developing country flexibilities should not undermine growth in normal trade. Trade also featured in discussions on the sidelines of gatherings of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APECand on the agenda of the Toronto and Seoul summits of the G group of leading economies — only for officials to find that the interests of major trading powers were still not close enough for a Doha deal to be struck in the near future. In earlyMexico and Brazil tabled separate proposals on breaking the Doha deadlock, including possible trade-offs between separate negotiating areas such as agriculture and manufactured goods: The plan was officially announced in May: At the insistence of the US, the package was broadened to include non-LDC issues too. However, the package quickly began to unravel as members became unable to agree on which LDC and non-LDC items to include. Consensus proved elusive on the four main issues that LDCs sought to include: Others blame the rise of emerging economies such as Brazil, China and India, together with more assertive developing country coalitions. Others still link it to the global financial crisis and recent domestic difficulties in the EU and the US which have prevented those countries from fully exercising a leadership role in WTO negotiations. All these factors are relevant, but critics are increasingly pointing to a more fundamental flaw in the system, which relates to the way in which negotiations are conducted. Some observers have therefore argued that thorough reform of the system system needed to overcome the current paralysis. In fact some experts argue that the WTO has served as a model governance system at the international level, predominantly because of its automatic and enforceable dispute settlement system. Moreover, through its set of rules and disciplines, it is argued, the WTO has also been successful in preventing protectionist tendencies during economic crisis. The objectives behind those proposals and the pace of proposed reforms have been equally diverse, going from incremental improvements to radical changes in the way the institution functions. While some proposals have been introduced by governments, others have been put forward by academia, research institutes, civil society and other international organisations. Reforms — or incremental changes — have happened on a number of fronts, including at the management level, in external transparency, public participation in dispute settlement proceedings or in the way in which negotiations are conducted Deere-Birbeck and Monagle, There are, however, diverging views on the desirability and impact of these changes and on whether they go far enough. Consensus is not interpreted as requiring unanimity; however, 3 if no present member state objects, consensus is assumed. The single undertaking, on the other hand, requires that all areas are negotiated and adopted by all parties at the same time. With the secretariat assuming an almost marginal role and the consensus principle on the basis of sovereign equality permeating all areas and functions of the organisation, the dominance of contracting parties is its main characteristic. The consensus principle is important for developing countries as, in theory, it guarantees that every member can veto any decisions, irrespective of its political or economic power. The single undertaking, on the other hand, has supported developing countries on numerous occasions, for instance when a group of Latin American members halted the establishment of the WTO until certain concessions of vital interest to developing countries had been made Croome, In practice, wealthier nations can hold trade talks hostage more easily than poorer ones, because of the fact that they are better able to withstand political pressure to join a consensus even against great opposition Steinberg, ; Cottier and Elsig, ; Low, The consensus principle is thus less about the actual consensual adoption of a final decision than about the process of consensus-building Ismail and Vickers, The largest trading nations therefore bear particular responsibility for helping countries to reach agreement by guiding the process of consensus-building and facilitating an atmosphere of compromise. It is […] disturbing that critics of the consensus principle raise efficiency concerns only when smaller developing countries and larger emerging economies e. This is particularly true for the current round, where negotiators do not seek to establish linkages systematically with a view to achieving long-term benefits, but focus instead on achieving short-term gains for tactical reasons Rodriguez Mendoza and Wilke, The introduction of linkages prevents certain areas from moving ahead independent of progress in others. As a result, even small deals cannot be reached, as new proposals prompt further linkages. Some experts also suggest taking into account country size or population, arguing that this would ensure power is shared fairly among developed, emerging and other developing countries Cottier and Takenoshita, ; Elsig, However, experience with weighted voting approaches in the International Monetary Fund IMF and World Bank show that the approach can easily manifest real power asymmetries rather than overcoming imbalances Warwick Commission, The alternative, a simple majority vote, could be difficult to introduce as it would undermine the currently powerful position of developed countries by enabling groups of smaller countries to overrule them. Experience in the United Nations UN General Assembly indicates that many countries would systematically oppose the introduction of a simple majority vote Anghie, Plurilateral agreements, for example, have already been used in the past. Here, the participation of all WTO members is not required in order to strike a deal and interested members are free to join the negotiation or not. Several experts have suggested reviving and enhancing this approach Consultative Board, ; Elsig, Supporters argue that the inclusion of import share in the threshold would ensure that critical mass agreements could not be misused by exporters to harmonise their export systems to the detriment of importers — an issue they consider to be of increasing importance as, for instance, high-technology producing countries face shortages in needed raw materials that are extracted in only a handful of countries ICTSD, d. Proposed thresholds range from 75 to 90 per cent. Proponents argue that the threshold could further be coupled with the requirement to include at least a minimum number of countries. If constructed in a sensitive way, supporters suggest, this second requirement could ensure the legitimacy of a particular critical mass rather than only its efficiency. As the WTO moves towards addressing a greater array of trade-related policies, such a critical mass concept might be inappropriate. Small countries, for instance, may not have a particular export or import trade share in a certain sector and are thus not indispensable for a critical mass, yet they would be meaning affected by any new rules — be this on agriculture commodities or new regulation on services trade. Each negotiation is thus also about shaping global policy and law trends. Current plurilateral WTO agreements where no critical mass was required only apply among the members that have signed them. To meet this concern, alternative proposals suggest extending the rights and benefits deriving from critical mass agreements on an MFN basis to all WTO members Warwick Commission, First, assuming that a given sector was irrelevant for a particular country at the time when a critical mass negotiation was concluded, it remains unclear how the country could be induced to join the agreement if the benefits already apply on an MFN basis. Also, it is unclear whether a country would be required to join the existing agreement or whether there would be an option to renegotiate the terms Harbinson, If no changes were allowed, powerful groups could now conclude agreements that become relevant for developing countries only at a later stage, thus indirectly imposing their terms and conditions. Criticisms regarding a trend towards WTO-plus commitments in FTAs and the fear over the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement ACTA introducing a new global benchmark for the protection of intellectual property come to mind in this respect ICTSD, b. Instead, if implemented in their simplest form, both concepts risk excluding smaller countries and exacerbating power asymmetries. Also, none of the proposed reforms would be likely to resolve the current deadlock in the Doha round which results, to a large extent, from political differences rather than weak procedural rules. The same stakeholders fear that strengthening the secretariat could create a strong institution following its own internal agenda. Proponents agree that this could only be guaranteed if member states were to ensure a constant participation and oversight. Efforts on strengthening the secretariat would thus focus primarily on increased political support by member states rather than a budgetary increase or a mandate extension as advocated by others. The idea behind this is to redirect but not replace the preponderant role of member states, i. This process provides a critical opportunity to reflect on the most pressing challenges facing the organisation. If candidates were to take a strong position while countries provided them with clear indications on what is expected over the coming term, directors would receive a strong mandate to lead and guide even in critical times Deere-Birbeck and Monagle, A second point of entry could be the regular Ministerial Conferences. If members used the meetings to reflect on the standing of the WTO, the way forward and the actions expected in the coming multilateral, the secretariat could guide the organisation accordingly over the coming months. In fact Ministerial Conferences were originally meant to provide for such a forum. Only with the launch of the Doha Round they have turned into pure negotiation gatherings. Numerous developing countries have consistently criticised this development. But some critics argue that these ideas have gone nowhere because they have had no process to feed into. Currently only one set of proposals is being discussed in a formalised manner at the WTO, namely those related to dispute settlement WTO, b. As foreseen by the original WTO agreements a special session of the Dispute Settlement Body DSB has been reviewing related reform proposals since Formally it proceeds outside of the Doha Round and is not part of the single undertaking. In practice, however, the review is used as a trade-off opportunity in the Doha Round which has prevented any conclusion over the last 14 years. To allow for a proper debate, other reform proposals will also need to be addressed in a formalised process at the WTO. Such a process would probably need to involve and engage trade ministers themselves to generate sufficient credibility and political traction. Ideally, the process should be co-chaired and co-owned by a developing and a developed country trade minister. Enforcing such an objective and non-concession-based discussion could be easier if various reform meaning were debated in a joint forum with a common objective and a single plan of action. Moreover, a joint process would facilitate the coordination of different reforms ensuring that the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the WTO do not develop in opposite directions but are mutually supportive. During the preparatory process and under the leadership of India, 18 developed and developing countries had proposed to address the need for an institutional reform in a formalised and long-term manner. These missed opportunities further aggravate the dilemma of the WTO as political guidance becomes hampered at the very first stage Deere-Birbeck, If the secretariat assumed a more active role in preparing ministerial conferences and guiding towards processes as those called upon by the country coalition, initial opposition might be overcome. As a formal forum for discussing reform proposals continues to be missing, this could be the first step towards reform. However, the difficulty the WTO has experienced in bringing its troubled Doha Round talks to a successful conclusion is arguably hampering its ability to respond and adapt meaningfully to new public policy challenges. While calls for greater policy coherence have often come from the governments that constitute the membership of the global trade body, they have also come from civil society groups, the media and even from other intergovernmental agencies concerned with the relationship between trade and public policy objectives. Combined with increased investment in agriculture, international trade mighthelp offset future climate-induced production decreases in certain regions, ensuring that local populations can purchase food that may be unavailable in sufficient quantities through domestic production. These included provisions dealing with system prohibitions and restrictions article 12subsidies for public stockholding for food security purposes Annex 2, para. However, while food security is also related to numerous other aspects of the agreement, such as subsidy reform or market access considerations, it is not explicitly mentioned anywhere else in the text. The decision has since been widely criticised by developing countries, who have argued that loopholes in the text prevent them from requiring developed countries and the international financial institutions to implement its provisions. In the years running up to the Doha ministerial conference, developing country governments expressed growing concern that they were ill-equipped to implement the Uruguay Round agreements, that the provisions of these multilateral undermined domestic food security, or — as in the case of the System on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights TRIPS — that they had signed on to texts which affected their food security without fully understanding the practical and legal implications that might result. Measures to reform developed country subsidies and tariffs were also included as part of the same proposal. Such indicators included, for example, the share of local income spent on a particular product, employment by product, productivity levels, rates of self-sufficiency, or the contribution of a product to local nutrition. Based on this country-specific analysis the tariffs of the selected products would then qualify for gentler reduction under the Doha Round, or would even be exempt from any cuts. The G, however, encountered opposition to their proposals from developed countries seeking greater access to developing country markets, such as the US, but also from exporting developing countries, such as Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. It is also symptomatic of how the discussion evolved over time in the trade body from a fairly narrow understanding of food security to a highly complex and differentiated approach based on indicators. The African Group a group of developing countries that seeks reform of developed country agriculturealong with the G, has sought to expand the flexibility that the green box allows developing countries in being able to use domestic support to pursue national development goals. The first of these is the concern expressed by the G 20 and by efficient agricultural exporters in the Cairns Group, which have argued that trade-distorting support undermines competitiveness and food security in countries that do not subsidise their agricultural sectors. While net-food-importing countries have drawn on analysis FAO et al. However, possibly more important is a more generalised reluctance on the part of exporting countries to make concessions in the absence of more far-reaching disciplines on trade distortions on the import side. However, while heads of state and ministers reaffirmed the importance of access to markets and pledged their commitment to raise agricultural productivity by boosting aid and investment, the WTO continues to be seen as the sole forum where concrete market access and subsidy commitments can be made. Other trade-related issues such as biofuel subsidies have proven to be too controversial to be addressed meaningfully by the G-8 or G Tangermann,leaving their food security implications unresolved for the time being. The WTO, FAO and eight other relevant bodies also collaborated around the inter-agency report to the G in the first half of FAO et al. However, much more could still be done in this regard. Recent suggestions have included ensuring that the WTO Committee on Agriculture takes a more active role in reviewing food security issues related to trade, and strengthening the collaboration between the CWFS, the WTO, the World Bank and the Rome-based institutions Ahmad, Reforming and improving the international governance framework is a necessary step towards overcoming current shortcomings on trade and food security, even though by itself it will not be sufficient to do so. The disconnect between governance mechanisms responsible for development and aid, for the environment and for agricultural policy can mean that, for example, EU or US policies on farm subsidies may be at odds with policies pursued on related issues such as climate or poverty. Furthermore, to a great extent, the geopolitical tensions between countries and blocs that have thwarted progress on international trade issues are mirrored by similar tensions on climate change, food security and development issues more generally. Behind these lie configurations of domestic interests and political constituencies at the national and sub-national level. At the same time, negotiators are reluctant to abandon the investment that has been made in elaborating a package of farm trade disciplines that are perceived to go some way towards restructuring an agricultural trading system that has been heavily criticised for failing to deliver on a range of global public policy goals, including food security. Until countries are able to resolve the growing contradictions between domestic policies on trade, food security, climate and international development, there is little prospect of achieving greater policy coherence in these areas at the global level. Many new developing countries have since joined, and shifts in the balance of global economic and political power have transformed the playing field. Accordingly, new needs and different expectations have emerged, including demands on the decision-making processes, and their fairness and transparency. As described above, modern global trade governance requires a careful balance between greater efficiency, legitimacy and inclusiveness. These objectives are not incompatible, but would require WTO members to move from essentially promoting their individual short-term mercantilist interests to developing a shared vision to effectively advance global public policy goals. Numerous proposals have been put forward to strengthen the multilateral trading system. But as for any intergovernmental institution, change must come, trading be agreed to, from the inside. This calls for the establishment of an inclusive and bottom-up process, one that seeks input from all WTO members, as well as seeking submissions from the different actors in the international trade community. Only with such a process will ideas have a realistic chance to be considered, and be transformed into agents for strengthening the system. Beyond the WTO negotiating function, there might be therefore merit in strengthening the work of the regular WTO committees. In the run-up to the Ministerial Conference, several such proposals were put on the table, notably by India. Many of these proposals are still relevant today. These could include concerns around the trade dimension of food security, food prices and export restrictions; the potential trade impacts of emerging domestic policies designed to combat climate change; or highly controversial matters around exchange rate policies and current trade imbalances. This is not to say that the WTO should become the sole or even primary body to deal with these matters. Several other institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCCFAO or IMF have indeed a major role to play in this area. The WTO, as the main organisation dealing with trade rules, should nevertheless contribute to addressing them insofar as they are linked to trade. Willingness to do system has already been expressed by a wide and cross-cutting segment of the WTO membership, but as a first step it might be more realistic to address these issues in a non-negotiating setting. In doing so, members could assess whether the WTO rule book is properly equipped to deal with emerging challenges or whether existing disciplines need to be clarified or amended. Existing institutional structures such as the Committee on Agriculture could be used for such an exercise. Precedents for doing so already exist. Singapore, for example, has recently made a submission to the regular session of the Committee on Trade and Environment to embark on work examining possible trade applications of border tax adjustment as a way to address competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns in climate change. Such an approach would enable the system to address challenges of the twenty-first century and prepare the ground for future negotiations when the political situation is ripe. AFDB African Development BankOECD Organization multilateral Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa African Economic Outlook Paris: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. Consultative Board to the Director-General The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Changes in the New Millennium Geneva: Elsig Reforming the WTO: The Decisions-Making Triangle Re-Addressedpaper presented at the World Trade Forum, World Trade Institute, University of Bern. The World Trading System and the Doha Round Vienna: World Trade Organisation — WTO. Monagle Strengthening Multilateralism: ICTSD and Global Economic Governance Programme. Performance in a Member-Driven Milieupaper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, 15—18 February. Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. FAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIMF International Monetary MeaningOECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentWFP World Food ProgrammeWorld Bank, WTO, IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute and the UN HLTF High-Level Task Force Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: FAO Rome Declaration on Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of ActionW Rome: Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Green Box: Ensuring Coherence with Sustainable Development Goals Cambridge: ICTSD WTO Ministerial Conference Opens in Geneva: Some Empirical Evidence Geneva: Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development Cambridge: Nye Between Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacypaper presented at the American Political Science Convention, Washington, DC, 31 August—3 September. Group of 33 Influence at the World Trade OrganizationLatin American Trade Network Working Paper no. Latin American School of Social Scienceshttp: An Examination of Proposed Additional Flexibilities for Developing CountriesIIIS Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper no. IIIS, Trinity Collegehttp: Oxfam Rigged Rules and Double Standards. Wilfrid Laurier University Presspp. From Rhetoric to Action? UNCTAD World Investment ReportNon-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Geneva: United Nations General Assembly United Nations Millennium Declaration. United Nations General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights New York: United Nationshttp: United Nations General Assembly International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights New York: Warwick Commission The Multilateral Trade Regime: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Cambridge: The University of Warwick. WTO a World Trade Report The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence Geneva: WTO b Quarterly World Merchandise Trade by Region and Selected Economies Geneva: Despite its comprehensive analysis and concrete recommendations, the Sutherland Report was, however, criticised as a defence of the status quoproduced by insiders, thus lacking novel approaches Hufbauer, ; Pauwelyn, As such it did not provide the necessary impetus to initiate a structured discussion among members. When members realised that the trade package to be presented at the end of the negotiation round would include new areas such as intellectual property rights and services, the need arose to discuss processes and structures that would ensure the coherence of these different agreements. The decision to establish the WTO finally stemmed from that discussion and other related considerations in the negotiation Group on the Functioning of the GATT FOGS. Since no systemic, long-term negotiations had taken place on a potential international organisation, most agreements with the exception of the Dispute Settlement Understanding DSU which had been revised completely during the Uruguay Round thus replicate the principles that have served that GATT for the last five decades. Moreover, when members launched the ongoing Doha Round they referred back to the negotiation principles used during the Uruguay Round, namely the principles of consensus and single undertaking. See Rodriguez Mendoza and Wilke See Ismail and Vickers However, agreements reached at an early stage may be implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis. Currently the United States holds roughly 17 per cent of the votes, with the G-7 holding a total of 45 per cent. Investment trading the agriculture sector, land rights and access to water and other natural resources are of equal importance in this context. However, the following discussion will be limited to the interface of the multilateral trading system and food security. See, for example, Oxfam The text further specifies: Beyond that, we will ensure elimination of commercial displacement. To this end, we will agree effective disciplines on in-kind food aid, monetization and re-exports so that there can be no loop-hole for continuing export subsidization. Programmes Director at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ICTSD. He has previously worked for the Swiss Coalition of Development Organisations. He also was a Research Associate at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago. Agriculture Programme Manager, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ICTSD. He previously worked on trade, development and human rights issues at the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva. International Trade Law Programme Officer at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ICTSD. Previously she worked for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD and for the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. She holds a law degree from Hanse Law School and an LLM in Public International Law from Helsinki University summa cum laude. Peer-reviewed journal that promotes cutting-edge research and policy debates on global development. Published by the Graduate Institute Geneva, it links up with international policy negotiations involving Geneva-based organisations. Contents — Next document. Christophe BellmannJonathan Hepburn and Marie Wilke. Index terms Thematic keywords: World Trade Organization WTOFood and Agriculture Organization FAO. Fair and inclusive global trade governance. The WTO and global public policy goals: Full text PDF Send by e-mail. Introduction 1 The —09 financial crisis and the current sovereign debt crisis in Europe have not only highlighted the high level of economic interdependencies existing worldwide, but also the growing challenges in pursuing international collaborative actions to address urgent sustainable development challenges. The international context 2. Zoom Original png, 31k. Bibliography AFDB African Development BankOECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentUNDP United Trading Development ProgrammeUNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa African Economic Outlook Paris: List of illustrations Title Figure 9. About the authors Christophe Bellmann Programmes Director at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ICTSD. By this author The Role of Trade and Trade Policy in Advancing the Development Agenda [Original article in full]. Implications for Development and the WTO [Original article in full]. Copyright Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3. 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